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 Introduction 
In an attempt to meet energy needs in a responsible and sustainable way, a 
revolutionary nuclear reactor concept is having its engineering feasibility re-
assessed. This reactor design is the Accelerator-Driven Subcritical Reactor 
(ADSR), the concept for which dates back to the 1990’s (Bowman et al., 1992; 
Carminati et al., 1993). If hopes for ADSRs are fulfilled then they will provide the 
world with electricity while: emitting minimal amounts of CO2; ensuring a high 
level of safety during operation due to the use of an accelerator and a subcritical 
reactor core; achieving a significant reduction in backend radioactive waste 
compared to contemporary reactors – they may even consume waste from other 
reactors; and extending the consumption time of the world’s uranium and 
thorium resources by multiple orders of magnitude. Inevitably a power station 
that promises so many benefits is not without its challenges. Multiple aspects of 
the engineering requirements of the design are the subject of challenging 
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Research and Development (R&D) programmes (European Technical Working 
Group on ADS (ETWG-ADS), 2001); chief areas of concern are the reliability of 
the accelerator system, the reliability of the beam target (the interface between 
the accelerator and reactor core) and long-term corrosion of the steel structure 
due to the presence of heavy liquid metal. A poor outcome from this R&D would 
be the finding that the design requirements of ADSRs are extreme to the point 
that they are untenably expensive. 
 
In the commercial electricity market, all the nuclear power stations ever 
constructed have self-sustained fission reactions during operation – they are all 
critical reactors. When a critical reactor is operating, electricity is generated. For 
the ADSR (a subcritical reactor) only when the nuclear core and its accelerator 
system are operating is energy generation sustained and electricity produced. To 
date no attempt has been made to couple together an accelerator, beam target 
and nuclear reactor as a single system to produce a sustained nuclear chain 
reaction for greater than a nominal power output. A proposal for doing this at 
the Belgian nuclear research facility, StudeCentrum voor Kernenerge Centre 
d’etude de l’Energie Nucleaire (SCK·CEN), has recently received support from the 
Belgian government (StudeCentrum voor kernenerge Centre d’etude de l’Energie 
Nucleaire, 2010). The study is intended to be complete by the year 2024. 
 
The financing of any nuclear power station is dominated by capital costs. There 
is therefore a significant financial risk associated with the construction of a 
nuclear power station. The risk is particularly large when demonstrating the 
first-of-a-kind of a technology; this issue is exemplified by the escalating costs 
and delays currently being experienced at the Finnish Olkiluoto facility (World 
Nuclear Association (WNA), 2010), which is constructing the world’s first 
European Pressurised water Reactor (EPR). It now appears as if the EPR will be a 
loss leader (Harding, 2007). It is not unheard of for first-of-a-kind nuclear 
reactors to be loss leaders; there have even been instances in the past where 
vendors planned from the outset to make their new design as such (Kaijser, 
1992). 
 
In addition to typical economic construction risks, ADSRs add unique new risks. 
These are due to the required accelerated proton beam and the beam target. 
Only the accelerator, and not the beam target, is the subject of the presented 
work. Contemporary accelerator systems are less powerful and less reliable than 
the specifications quoted for ADSRs (ETWG-ADS, 2001; Burgazzi and 
Pierini, 2007). Accelerator-specific R&D is being carried out to bridge this 
technological gap (Teng, 2001; Pierini et al., 2003; Burgazzi and Pierini, 2007). 
Even if R&D predictions are optimistic enough such that ADSRs do appear worth 
pursuing as a commercial proposition, there will still be risks associated with 
whether accelerator performance will meet the predictions. 
 
With similarity to how unanticipated design flaws in the first-of-a-kind EPR have 
led to delays in its construction, an unexpectedly high rate of unplanned 
shutdowns of the first-of-a-kind ADSR accelerator system will affect its 
performance throughout its operational lifetime. If the reliability of a realised 
ADSR accelerator is poor then either the revenue of the ADSR will be low or the 
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cost of failing to fulfil electricity contracts will be high. Regardless, the ADSR will 
return less marginal profit to offset the capital expenditure. This is not desirable 
for nuclear power stations as they typically operate as base-load electricity 
generators with low marginal costs of generation (Pouret et al., 2009). 
 
An economic analysis of the benefits and costs associated with designing 
increased multiplicity for ADSR accelerators is deliberated. The aim is twofold. 
The first aim is to scrutinise formally an assumption that to the authors’ 
knowledge has yet to be addressed in peer reviewed literature. The assumption 
is that designing an ADSR to have multiple LINear ACcelerators (LINACs) will 
untenably raise the cost of the ADSR. The analysis is mindful of, and therefore 
lends itself to, the possibility that types of accelerator other than LINACs might 
be the preferred choice for an ADSR; the cost of other accelerator types may be 
significantly less than LINACs and therefore the construction of multiple devices 
more reasonable. 
 
The second aim is to recognise that, given the large capital that is at risk, a 
second accelerator will significantly reduce investment uncertainty, even though 
it will increase the cost of constructing the ADSR. This second aim is considered 
to be of particular interest for the first-of-a-kind ADSR. This is because, following 
R&D, this will be the time when there is greatest uncertainty regarding 
accelerator reliability. Treating the reactor vending and operating companies as 
a single company, it may be that a vendor-operator’s strategy is to demonstrate 
the technology with a less risky ADSR driven by two accelerators. The long-term 
aim being that the nth-of-a-kind ADSR will be driven only by a single accelerator, 
should the technology prove to be successful.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, there is a review of what the demands 
are on an accelerator used to drive a nuclear reactor. The performance achieved 
by contemporary high-power accelerators is detailed along with expectations of 
future performance from accelerator R&D literature. Next an ADSR designed 
with two accelerators is described whose primary aim is to reduce the reliability 
demands on the individual accelerators. A 4-step real options design framework 
is then used along with an economic model to assess the expected value of ADSRs 
designed with either one or two accelerators. In particular, the real options 
framework enables the recognition of an accelerator system design that is a 
balance between the one or two accelerator designs; this, and a second flexible 
design that builds and tests an accelerator before constructing a reactor, are 
discussed and also assessed in the economic model. A qualitative discussion is 
given, which highlights for all of the designs the pros and cons not captured by 
the current economic analysis. At the end of the discussion a speculative design 
idea for a phased and integrated “park” of multiple reactors is suggested. The 
design suggestions that feature in the reactor park are motivated by the 
economic concerns of making the levelised cost of electricity as low as possible, 
while also keeping the capital at risk to a minimum. Conclusions from the 
investigation are given at the end of the paper. Appendix A explains possible 
methods for how dual accelerators might best be operated and Appendix B 
indicates the coinciding unplanned shutdown frequency of an accelerator 
network. 
 4 
 Technology Review – Particle Accelerators for Nuclear 
Reactors 
The accelerator system of ADSRs is commonly foreseen to be either a single 3-
stage LINAC (Ruggiero, 1997; Pierini et al., 2003) or a compact “circular” 
accelerating technology, for example cyclotrons (“warm” or superconducting), 
rapid cycling synchrotrons or fixed field alternating gradient accelerators. LINAC 
technology is the subject of the presented analysis. LINACs have been chosen 
because: (1) the beam power that they are expected to provide implies that the 
number of LINACs used to drive the ADSR will be lower than for the other 
technologies – this simplifies the presented analysis; (2) because cost 
assessments have already been performed for ADSR LINACs; and (3) because the 
planned Belgian SCK·CEN test reactor is intended to be driven by a 
LINAC (Pierini et al., 2003). Equivalent analysis of other technologies would be 
equally valid.  
 
The analysis described assumes a single beam target ADSR design. Considering 
multiple targets would introduce additional complexity to the analysis, due to 
the requirement of a complex beam transport system for the multi-accelerator 
system considered in the presented analysis. For convenience and to frame the 
discussion such that it is clear that other accelerator types can be assessed in the 
same manner, 3-stage LINACs are referred to simply as “accelerators”. 
 
The ADSR accelerator system provides a high-energy, high-power proton beam, 
which impinges on a heavy metal beam target. This induces nuclear spallation 
reactions. Spallation is the act of splitting nuclei, creating a “cocktail” of species 
of smaller secondary nuclei. Among many other products, this generates a 
number of neutrons. The target is placed inside the reactor core. The generated 
neutrons induce additional nuclear fission reactions inside the core. These extra 
fissions sustain the fission chain reaction and thus energy generation, which 
promptly ceases if the accelerator system is turned off. Figure 1 shows a concept 
diagram for the linear accelerator ADSR design. 
 
 
Figure 1: Concept diagram for a linear accelerator system ADSR. This diagram has been modified 
from reference (Pierini, 2007). 
 
An identified expectation of a commercially viable ADSR is that the accelerator 
system should not suffer more than approximately 5-10 unscheduled 
interruptions per year (of duration ≥ 1 second) or else the associated incurred 
costs of the unplanned shutdowns will have unacceptable financial 
implications (ETWG-ADS, 2001). From a technical perspective, following detailed 
analysis it has been shown that the reactor core (not the accelerator system) of 
the planned SCK·CEN test reactor would have to experience hundreds of sudden 
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unplanned shutdowns per year before its structural integrity would be 
compromised (Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), 2009). The planned SCK·CEN test 
reactor, however, is far from commercial scale; it is not necessarily a fair 
comparison with a larger reactor. In a recent presentation reviewing current 
knowledge on the number of unplanned accelerator shutdowns ADSRs can 
tolerate it has been stated that: 
 
“Influence for the thermal shock damage on the ADS reactor system 
caused by beam trips has not been evaluated sufficiently... 
 
“…The acceptable frequency of beam trips ranges from 50 to 
2 × 104  times per year, depending on the beam trip 
duration.” (Takei et al., 2010) 
 
This statement was made in reference to a specific ADSR design of power 
800 MWth; the numbers are clearly subject to change. “Trip” is a common way of 
referring to an unplanned accelerator shutdown; this terminology is used 
henceforth.  
 
The term Operational Availability (OA) is defined in this work to be the 
percentage of the year a subcomponent of the power station is not undergoing 
scheduled maintenance, it is therefore inclusive of the time down due to 
unscheduled shutdownsi. A high level view of the ADSR is taken, identifying two 
essential subcomponents: the accelerator system and the nuclear reactor (the 
reactor is considered to include all other key systems such as the beam target 
and windowii). The OA of the whole plant is given by the overlap in time that the 
subcomponents are operationally available. Because nuclear power stations are 
base-load generators it is expected that the power station will be contracted to 
sell electricity at all times when it is operationally available. The Capacity 
Factor (CF)iii is therefore the OA multiplied by its coefficient of reliability. For 
contemporary nuclear power stations (they do not require an accelerator) OA is 
approximately equal to the CF because they are highly reliable. A typical CF for a 
contemporary reactor is 75-90% (WNA, 2009). 
 
Contemporary high-power accelerator systems at research facilities are 70% 
reliable when they first start operating. This rises to 90% for seasoned facilities 
(Galambos et al., 2008)iv. This takes about 5 years (Kim and Galambos, 2010). 
Seasoned facilities expect of the order of 7500 shutdowns per year (at 
OA = 70%) of duration ≥ 1 second (Galambos et al., 2008). These research 
                                                 
i In this paper unscheduled shutdowns of accelerators are considered to occur when there is an 
accelerator beam interruption that lasts for > 1 second. 
ii The proton beam exits the vacuum of the accelerator transport system through a thin “window” 
(typically a titanium-vanadium alloy) and impinges on the beam target (expected to be lead or 
lead-bismuth) where neutrons and other products are generated through spallation reactions. 
The radiation damage to the window and target will potentially cause them to have poor 
reliability characteristics. 
iii Capacity Factor (CF) is the ratio of the actual plant power output to the output had it operated 
continuously at full power during the same period. 
iv Within the reference reliability is termed “availability”. “Availability” should not be confused 
with “operational availability”, as defined in this paper. 
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facilities, however, work to budgets that do not allow for the maximisation of 
reliability that could be achieved with existing technology. Discussion with 
accelerator operators (Findlay, 2009) and examination of accelerator reliability 
optimisation studies (Pierini et al., 2003) suggest that if greater finance were 
available for: (1) adding additional components into existing accelerators; (2) 
having more spare parts available on site; and (3) hiring additional staff, then the 
rate of occurrence of trips is expected to significantly reduce. Importantly 
accelerator shutdowns of duration ≥ 24 hours could be almost entirely 
eliminated, as they are predominantly caused by insufficient staff numbers or 
spare parts not being immediately available (Findlay, 2009). 
 
A study, Preliminary Design Studies for eXperimental Accelerator-Driven Systems 
(PDS-XADS), has examined how best to design a LINAC for ADSRs 
(Pierini et al., 2003). The study presents a favoured selection and configuration 
of components having taken into consideration that: 
 
“In existing accelerator facilities it is common to schedule short and 
frequent (weekly) maintenance periods, whereas for the XADS [their 
ADSR design] clearly the maintenance policy needs to be compatible 
with the fuel cycle, requiring a more careful planning of fault tolerance 
and redundancies, or finding strategies in order to access devices that 
may fail frequently, without requiring the accelerator shut down.” 
 
In consideration of this, it is preferable for the accelerator to be available or 
undergoing planned maintenance in concordance with the reactor; therefore it is 
most desirable for the OA of an accelerator, OAaccel, to be equal to the OA of its 
counterpart nuclear reactor, OAreactor. It may, however, have to be less than this 
value, should poor reliability result in additional maintenance time improving 
the economic value of the ADSR (through the avoidance of costs associated with 
unplanned shutdowns). In this work OAreactor is a constant and has been assumed 
to be equivalent to expectations of Generation III power stations, which are 
predicted to have a CF of 85% (OAreactor for the ADSR is therefore 85%) 
(ETWG-ADS, 2001; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 2003; 
University of Chicago, 2004; Kennedy, 2007). For an ADSR this corresponds to 
OAreactor = 85%. The presented calculations have been performed for OAaccel 
values from 40% to up to 90%. 
 
It may be challenging to meet the accelerator reliability expectations of 
(Pierini et al., 2003); active researchers in the field of high-power particle 
accelerators have more conservative opinions regarding what accelerator 
technology is capable of achieving: 
 
“From readily available data (Galambos et al., 2008) on high-power 
proton accelerators, and from the ~70% of the year for which these 
accelerators are typically scheduled to operate – maintenance being 
carried out when the machines are not operational, it is possible that a 
reliability of ~95% could be achieved by devoting ~50% of the year to 
maintenance, thereby restricting operations [OAaccel] to ~50% of the 
year.” (Findlay, 2009) 
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This statement implies that in order to reach high reliability (and therefore 
reduce the number of unplanned shutdowns during scheduled operation) the OA 
of a single accelerator ADSR will not be able to exceed 50%. The statement was 
made with the assumption that the accelerator receives regular (weekly) 
maintenance, in line with current practice, not in line with reactor fuel cycle 
schedules. It therefore implies that the accelerator and reactor OAs will not be 
harmonised. 
 
As the ADSR will only generate electricity (and therefore revenue) when both the 
reactor core and an accelerator are operating, the realised ADSR CF is 
proportional to the degree of harmonisation of the reactor and accelerator 
maintenance schedules. Current practice for operating existing reactors is to 
extend fuel cycles for as long as possible, as this increases facility CFs (and hence 
revenue). At research-based accelerator facilities many regular maintenance 
shutdowns are needed to maximise reliability and beam quality; typically 
accelerators do not continually run for more than a few weeks at a time. The 
current maintenance practices for operating accelerators and reactors therefore 
do not lend themselves to synchronisation. This was considered during the 
design of the 3-stage LINAC developed in the European PDS-XADS 
(Pierini et al., 2003) – see quote above. They have designed an accelerator that is 
intended to operate for long periods between scheduled maintenance. 
 
 Technology Review – Accelerator Reliability and ADSR 
Value Maximisation 
The rate of occurrence of trips increases as the scheduled OA increases, i.e. the 
devices become less reliable as time for beam studies and equipment diagnostics 
is reduced. Contemporary accelerators experience over two orders of magnitude 
more trips than an ADSR can tolerate. Unless a full-scale test accelerator is 
constructed (see section “Step 3: Flexibility in Design”) in advance of realising 
the first-of-a-kind ADSR, there is likely to be significant uncertainty regarding the 
trip frequency at any given OA of the accelerator. There will also be uncertainty 
in the relationship between trip frequency and different OAs. 
 
The duration of shutdowns of contemporary accelerators ranges from 
microseconds up to months. The frequency at which shutdowns of a given 
duration or longer occur approximately follows a –2/3 power law, where shorter 
durations are more common than longer, see Galambos et al. (2008) and 
Steer et al. (2009). At existing accelerator facilities, shutdown 
durations ≥ 24 hours are typically due to insufficient numbers of staff and the 
lack of onsite replacement parts. These issues can be solved by making available 
additional finances. It is therefore assumed that these two factors will not be an 
issue for an operator of a commercial power station. It has been assumed that 
trips in contemporary research facility accelerators that would extend beyond 
24 hours are fixed in exactly 24 hours. It is also assumed in all of the presented 
analysis that all reactor core shutdowns cause a closure of the plant 24 hours in 
duration, even if the accelerator trip duration is significantly shorter than 
24 hours. This assumption has been made on the basis that nuclear regulator 
approved restart procedures will have to be enacted, and that these will take a 
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considerable number of hours to carry out. If it should turn out that no such 
procedures are required then the average opportunity cost of an accelerator trip 
will reduce, allowing for more to be tolerated from an economic perspective. 
 
In liberalised commercial energy markets there will be a financial cost associated 
with each instance that accelerator trips result in the unplanned shutdown of the 
ADSR. An assessment of that cost has been made by Steer et al. (2009). The 
assessment suggests that if an ADSR were to operate in the contemporary UK 
electricity market, then for each unanticipated 24 hour shutdown an ADSR 
experiences it will require ~0.43 days of successful operation to balance the cost 
incurred (i.e. excluding capital costs, it only becomes profitable to operate the 
ADSR if it is successfully operating for greater than 3 of every 10 days of 
scheduled operation). For OAreactor = 85%, this implies that it is not desirable for 
an ADSR to experience more than 365 days × 0.85 × (1 – 3/10) ≈ 200 shutdowns 
per year (each of duration 24 hours), or else it would be more economically 
attractive to close the plant.  
 
Because the trip rate for a chosen OAaccel value and also the relationship between 
that trip rate and the rate for other values of OAaccel are not known, it is not 
possible to identify explicitly whether the financially optimal method of 
generating energy from ADSRs is to schedule the facility to run for a large 
fraction of the year, but with poor reliability, or for a smaller fraction of the year, 
but with increased reliability. The opportunity cost of each type of down time is 
not equal; while no revenue is made during planned maintenance, revenue is 
exceeded by the cost of failing to fulfil contracts during unplanned shutdowns, 
making it more expensive per unit time. For the topics discussed it is of no 
consequence which method is more valuable. One can theorise an equivalent 
device, which is 100% reliable and operates for a fraction of the year ranging 
from 0% to 85%. In these terms, the uncertainty regarding accelerator reliability 
can be comprehensively described by an effective OAaccel (where the effective OA 
assumes 100% reliability during scheduled operation). Assuming all other 
systems (e.g. beam target, heat exchangers, etc.) are 100% reliable, the effective 
OAaccel uncertainty solely dictates plant CF variances, which directly affect the 
quantity of electricity sales and hence the financial value of the device. 
 
The hypothesis that there is potentially value in operating an ADSR with multiple 
accelerators, rather than only one is examined. The paper considers an ADSR 
driven by two accelerators; however, there is no reason why three, four or more 
cannot be considered. Each additional accelerator incurs an increase in the 
capital cost of the ADSR and will also increase the running costs of the facility. In 
exchange for these costs, additional accelerators reduce the reliability demands 
on the devices. It is therefore expected that there will be less uncertainty 
regarding the levelised cost of an ADSR driven by two accelerators, while also the 
net effect may be to improve their profit/loss margin. 
 
The presented analysis has been performed using the assumption that an ADSR 
operator expects that the nth-of-a-kind reactor should be able to sell electricity 
profitably with only one accelerator, but that for the first-of-a-kind ADSR a 
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second accelerator may be required in order to limit the risks associated with 
testing the new technology. 
 
In Appendix A potential modes of operation for driving a nuclear core with two 
accelerators are described. An economic evaluation of the ADSR value is not 
sensitive to which mode of operation is selected: it is a technical decision. Of 
concern to the economic analysis is that it is (conservatively) expected that both 
accelerators will be consuming power at all times of scheduled operation, and 
also that the reactor core will only suffer an unplanned shutdown at times when 
both accelerators trip in coincidence for an overlap period of at least 1 second in 
duration. As it is considered that both accelerators are consuming power at all 
times during scheduled operation, in the presented analysis a two accelerator 
ADSR has less electricity available to sell into the market than a one accelerator 
ADSR. 
 
Analysis has been performed, identifying the expected frequency of coincident 
shutdowns of two accelerators over a period of 12 months for OAaccel = 85%. It 
assumes that trips in each accelerator occur completely independently of one 
another. Each unplanned accelerator shutdown results in a 24 hour shutdown of 
the ADSR; the maximum possible number of shutdowns is therefore 
365 × 0.85 = 310 per year. For the remaining days of the year the reactor is down 
for scheduled maintenance. The analysis has been performed for a wide range of 
values of the total number of trips per accelerator per year. The duration of each 
of the trips is set such that it is in the range 1 second to 24 hours, distributed 
according to the –2/3 power law described in Steer et al. (2009) and references 
therein. The result of the analysis is presented in the spectrum in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Annual number of coincident accelerator trips of duration ≥ 1 second for two accelerators 
for OAaccel = 85%. Coinciding trips cause a 24 hour shutdown of the ADSR. Inset is the same data for 
a different range. A single contemporary seasoned accelerator at a research facility is expected to 
experience ~7500 trips per year, while operating for only OAaccel ≈ 70%. 
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The spectrum in Figure 2 indicates that if two accelerator systems with power 
outputs that meet the requirements of an ADSR, but with contemporary 
reliability profiles (but operating at OAaccel = 85%), were used to drive the 
nuclear core then it is expected that the reactor would be down due to 
unplanned shutdowns for approximately 185 days per year of scheduled 
operation. The spectrum also shows that at the limit where it starts becoming 
more profitable to sell electricity than not (~200 one day in duration shutdowns 
per year), each accelerator would be experiencing approximately 9000 trips of 
duration ≥ 1 second per year. 
 
For a reactor driven by one accelerator (given the assumption of shutdowns 
lasting 24 hours), it is only sensible to discuss accelerators that trip less 
than ~200 times per year, or else the plant will be operating at a marginal loss 
and it is more financially beneficial not to sell electricity at all. In this reliability 
regime, a reactor driven by two accelerators experiences an average of less than 
1 unplanned shutdown per year, as shown in the inset spectrum in Figure 2. 
Therefore, for comparisons between one and two accelerator-driven reactors, 
regardless of the effective OAaccel each accelerator can reach, a two accelerator 
configuration is approximately 100% reliable and can be scheduled to sell 
electricity for OAaccel = 85%. This is reflected in the economic analysis. 
 
 Real Options Design Evaluation Under Uncertainty 
A financial model for an ADSR has been developed to investigate the hypothesis 
that there is potentially value in having two accelerators, rather than one. To 
examine the hypothesis, the four-step real options process described in 
Babajide et al. (2009) has been used. In the first stage an economic model is 
developed to identify a deterministic value for a design (or in this case the two 
designs, named: “Single” and “Dual”, in reference to the number of accelerators 
that drive the reactor). In the second stage the most significant uncertainties are 
taken into consideration, and the sensitivity of the designs to these uncertainties 
is identified. The third stage of the evaluation involves the identification of 
potentially valuable sources of flexibility in the design and also the relevant 
design considerations that need to be made in order to enable that flexibility. The 
flexible design is then compared to the deterministic accelerator configurations 
in the economic model, including the uncertainty. In the fourth step decision 
analysis methodology is used to recommend the most valuable deployment 
strategy between the considered designs. 
 
Two parameters outputted from the economic analysis are used to identify the 
value of the different designs. These are the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) 
measured in units of £ /MWh and the required Capital Expenditure Before First 
Revenue (CapExBFR). The LCOE is directly comparable with the price of electricity 
and therefore is a measure of the profitability and competitiveness of the design. 
The CapExBFR identifies the finance placed at risk during construction. 
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Step 1: Basic Economic Analysis 
To contextualise the identification of the value of Single and Dual accelerator systems 
in ADSRs, all costs associated with an ADSR facility have been considered using a 
top-down approach, from the beginning of the pre-development process until plant 
closure, including setting aside funds for geological disposal of nuclear waste and 
decommissioning. 
 
The work by Kennedy (2007) on Generation III nuclear power stations forms the 
central basis for the cost model. This work has been selected as the values used 
in the analysis are a compilation of multiple other economic assessments of 
Generation III nuclear power stations. The capital expenditure for construction is 
assumed to be distributed through time in the same shape as 0° to 180° of a sine 
curve; this is in the same manner as in the report: The Future of Nuclear Power 
(MIT, 2003). The interest accumulated on the construction loan (commonly 
referred to as Interest During Construction (IDC)) is calculated by the method 
described in the report: Cost Estimating Guidelines for Generation IV Nuclear 
Energy Systems (Generation IV International Forum, 2007). The sum of the pre-
development construction costs and their associated IDC identifies the total 
CapExBFR at the time the plant comes online. The inputs to the ADSR model are 
given in Table 1. Except where explicitly stated otherwise in the table, inputs are 
taken directly from the work by Kennedy (2007). All costs are in 2006 money. 
 
Table 1: List of parameters used in the financial model. Except where explicitly stated otherwise, the 
assumptions are taken from (Kennedy, 2007). 
 
 
Parameter Assumption Source/Comment 
Declared Net Capacity 
(DNC) of a single 
accelerator ADSR 
600 MWe This is a commonly cited size for a 
demonstrator ADSR. Physics and 
engineering considerations have 
driven the decision. The energy 
requirement of one accelerator 
(20 MWe) is considered to already 
be subtracted from the value. 
Additional energy 
consumed by second 
accelerator 
20 MWe When operating two accelerators, 
the plant DNC is reduced by this 
value. The value is taken from 
common quotes for accelerator 
energy consumption. This is 
considered to be the upper limit for 
the requirements of an accelerator 
and the redundant accelerator may 
not require all of this energy, see 
Appendix A. 
Pre-development costs £250 million Pre-development costs (e.g. site 
licensing) are assumed to be 
insensitive to plant size and type. 
Therefore the Kennedy (2007) EPR 
cost has been used. 
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Construction period of 
reactor and any 
accelerators 
constructed in parallel 
6 years In the “flexible” designs, see text, 
construction is (optionally) phased. 
There is only one construction phase 
for the Single and Dual designs. 
Construction period for 
the additional 
accelerator in the 
“Expandable” design, 
see text 
2 years to make the 
decision about 
whether to build it + 3 
years construction 
time following the 
decision 
Construction time has arbitrarily 
been halved to account for: 
foundations having been laid; the 
cryogenics facility only needing 
expanding and workers having had 
experience of constructing the first 
accelerator. This parameter is only 
used for the “Expandable” design, 
see text. 
Construction cost of 
power station 
excluding the 
accelerator proper and 
cryogenics facility 
£1625 /kWe (£975 
million) + IDC (£274 
million) 
Based on Kennedy (2007) “Central” 
scenario for a first-of-a-kind, but 
increased as described in 
(NEA, 2000) page 32, using a scale 
factor of n = 0.425. This is assumed 
to include the accelerator’s civil 
works, site engineering and indirect 
costs. 
Construction cost of a 
1 GeV 10 mA (LINAC) 
accelerator and 
cryogenics facility 
£290 million 
+ IDC (£82 million) 
Estimate from the XADS proposal 
(Safa et al., 2002) with a linear cost 
escalation of the “high-energy 
section” (excluding the cryogenics 
facility) to increase the 600 MeV 
beam energy to 1 GeV. A €1 = £1 
exchange rate was used. Escalating 
from 2002 to 2006 money and cost 
savings made by purchasing multiple 
accelerators have been neglected. 
Operational lifetime of 
reactor 
40 years  
Operational lifetime of 
a LINAC 
40 years Assumed to be equal to the reactor 
lifetime. High-power accelerators do 
operate for these time scales. For 
example the Swiss PSI cyclotron is 
still in operation after 36 years. 
Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) 
cost of nuclear reactor 
£7.70 /MWh  
O&M of an accelerator £34 million per 
annum for a single 
accelerator, a £17 
million per year 
increase for running 
two. 
Based on reported annual running 
costs of the Spallation Neutron 
Source at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (Hickey, 2009) and the 
European Synchrotron Radiation 
Facility (ESRF, 2007; ESRF, 2008). 
Operating two accelerators in 
parallel assumes a 25% benefit of 
economies of scale. 
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For a Single accelerator ADSR and for two different effective OA values (85% and 
50%) of the accelerator a breakdown of the LCOE has been calculated, 
highlighting the expected cost structure of an ADSR. The LCOE is also given for 
the Dual accelerator ADSR. In the regime of reliability that allows one to consider 
a Single accelerator design at any OAaccel, the Dual accelerator configuration is 
always most beneficially operated at OAaccel = 85%. The cost breakdown is given 
in the stacked histograms in Figure 3. 
 
OA of nuclear reactor 80% rising to 85% 
after the first 5 years 
 
OA of a linear 
accelerator 
≤ 85%. The first 5 
years of operation are 
5% lower than the 
subsequent years. 
When operating with only one 
accelerator this parameter is treated 
as an uncertain variable. No benefit 
is gained if it exceeds the maximum 
core OA (85%). 
Fuel supply cost 
(thorium fuel) 
£1.1 /MWh Thorium does not require 
enrichment. A fast thorium reactor 
burns nuclear fuel more efficiently 
than a thermal uranium reactor. The 
Kennedy (2007) cost of uranium fuel 
has been modified to exclude 
enrichment costs (50%) and reduce 
the quantity of ore mined by a factor 
of 8 (Bryan, 2009). Mining costs per 
kilogram are assumed to be equal. 
Combined radioactive 
waste disposal and 
decommissioning costs 
£9 million per annum, 
savings grow at a real 
rate of 2.5% annually. 
This is a total of £583 
million after 40 years 
of operation. 
The Kennedy (2007) EPR geological 
disposal cost is the same 
(£276 million at closure) and the 
decommissioning cost is modified to 
£513 million /GW. This is a simple 
linear extrapolation to 600 MWe of 
the vendor cost quotes for 
1600 MWe EPRs and 1200 MWe 
AP1000s. Fund payments are made 
at a fixed rate and therefore do not 
vary with sensitivity analysis on the 
effective OAaccel. 
Contractual cost of 
unplanned shutdowns 
£270,000 (mean loss 
made per 24 hour 
ADSR shutdown)  
Taken from the analysis performed 
in (Steer et al., 2009) for the mean 
cost of a single 24 hour unplanned 
shutdown, using the contemporary 
electricity price.  
Cost of capital 10% Post tax real weighted average cost 
of capital 
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Figure 3: LCOE breakdown for the Single design at two different accelerator effective OA values and 
the Dual design, in the reliability regime where the Single design can be considered. In the figure 
“funds” refers to the money set aside for the combined geological disposal and decommissioning; 
and O&M stands for Operation and Maintenance. 
 
 Step 2: Uncertainty 
Development is taking place in improving accelerator reliability (Teng, 2001; 
Pierini et al., 2003; Burgazzi and Pierini, 2007; Pierini, 2007). It is, however 
possible that a realised first-of-a-kind ADSR will not meet its OA expectations. 
OAaccel is therefore treated as an uncertain variable in the economic model. By 
assuming that the reactor core and accelerator operate perfectly harmonious 
maintenance schedules, the LCOE per MWh for a Single accelerator ADSR has 
been plotted as a function of its effective OAaccel, see Figure 4. As described above, 
it is always most profitable to operate a Dual accelerator ADSR at OAaccel = 85%. 
Its LCOE is therefore a constant in the presented analysis. The maximum OA 
value calculated is OAaccel = 90%; this exceeds the maximum OA of the reactor, 
OAreactor, which has been fixed at a value of OAreactor = 85%. 
 
As the effective OA of the accelerator reduces, the LCOE rises rapidly for the 
Single accelerator design. The lowest LCOE in the sensitivity analysis is for the 
Single accelerator design at OAaccel ≥ 85%, and is equal to £58.59 /MWh. This is 
significantly larger than the contemporary price of wholesale electricityv. Even 
considering the potential for an increase in the future price of electricity, the 
presented analysis suggests that the first-of-a-kind ADSR might be a loss leader. 
 
The spectrum in Figure 4 shows that the LCOE of a Single accelerator ADSR is 
sensitive to the effective OA achieved by the accelerator technology. For the 
plotted range the LCOE is roughly inversely proportional to effective OAaccel: 
halving effective OAaccel roughly doubles the LCOE. For Dual accelerators the 
LCOE is constant over the full effective OA range. The LCOE for the Dual 
accelerator configuration will measurably begin to escalate when the number of 
unplanned trips per accelerator reaches hundreds or more per year. (For 
context, in Figure 4 the Single accelerator ADSR at an effective OAaccel = 40% at 
maximum corresponds to a failure rate of ~ 95 trips per year.) 
                                                 
v In 2009 the mean UK market index price of electricity was £34.08 /MWh (this value has been 
adjusted to 2006 money using the consumer price index). 
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Figure 4: Levelised Cost of Electricity Production per MWh of electricity sold for a first-of-a-kind 
ADSR which has either a Single or Dual accelerator(s). Costs are in 2006 money. 
 
The sensitivity analysis clearly shows that the outcome of the uncertainty 
regarding accelerator trip frequency for an ADSR will determine whether ADSRs 
are financially more valuable through one accelerator being constructed or 
through two. The capital expenditure commitment required by Single or Dual 
accelerator ADSRs is not captured by the LCOE analysis. A Dual accelerator ADSR 
requires a larger initial CapExBFR (£2,493 million) than the Single 
(£2,121 million). The results presented in Figure 3 do not highlight all possible 
risks from other aspects of the realisation of an ADSR (construction delays, 
materials cost escalation, poor reliability of other key systems such as the beam 
target and/or window, skilled staff shortages, etc.). Although the Dual 
accelerator design reduces the technology demands on the accelerator system, it 
increases the financial exposure to risks from other aspects of the ADSR design 
by increasing the capital committed to the project.  
 
Step 3: Flexibility in Design 
It has been demonstrated that when constructing two accelerators rather than 
one, the operator hedges against the risk of numerous accelerator trips, but the 
Dual accelerator design is less valuable than the Single if effective OAaccel exceeds 
~67%. The operator must also consider whether the increased certainty 
regarding the LCOE is worth the increased CapExBFR, which is subject to risks in 
construction and operation that are not considered in the presented work. 
 
To try to capture the best aspects of both the Single and Dual accelerator 
configurations, a real options strategic decision making approach to building a 
flexible first-of-a-kind ADSR is considered; it has identified two more designs. 
This method of evaluation has previously proven to be successful in identifying 
the true potential value of projects as uncertainties are resolved. Real options 
enable this by allowing design-changing decisions to be made during the project 
(Myers, 1977; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). 
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Typical discounted cash flow analysis assumes a full commitment to a project; it 
does not dynamically adjust decisions during the project (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). By valuing a project through assuming that all 
decisions are made irreversibly at its beginning and not allowing for changes to 
be made as uncertainties are reduced, its maximum value may not be returned. 
With the Single and Dual accelerator systems in mind, one flexible design (named 
“Expandable”) is considered by hypothesising that the ADSR operator initially 
constructs only one accelerator, but plans for the possibility of needing the 
second. By planning from the outset that a second accelerator might be 
constructed later, the cost of building the second accelerator, and thus switching 
design types from a Single to Dual accelerators, can be kept low (Silver and 
de Weck, 2007). For example, accelerator construction work that would require 
the ADSR to temporarily close and stop selling electricity in order to be carried 
out should be completed during the initial construction of the plant. 
 
This Expandable design will incur CapExBFR costs ensuring the site is suitable and 
configuring infrastructure such that it can easily accommodate an additional 
accelerator if it is desired. In Table 2 factors expected to be important in enabling 
the option to build a second accelerator are detailed. Cost predictions are only 
given for the factors that are expected to be financially significant. For 
calculations of the flexible design, the costs in Table 2 are paid for during the 
initial construction of the plant. If the second accelerator is constructed later, the 
model determines the cost of that accelerator to be the same as the cost 
identified in Table 1 subtracted by the costs already paid as given in Table 2. The 
cost of capital for building the second accelerator is assumed to be a real rate of 
10%; this is the same as for the initial plant construction. 
 
Table 2: Factors that will require attention during the initial construction of an ADSR, to ensure cost 
minimisation should a second accelerator be constructed during the ADSRs operation. 
 
 
Factor Assumption Source/Comment 
Digging the second 
accelerator tunnel 
£35,000 /metre, 
400 metres long 
(£15 million) 
Cost per metre from reference 
(Ruggiero, 1997) assuming equivalent 
purchasing power parity and therefore 
an exchange rate of $1 = £1 and 
neglecting to escalate to 2006 money; 
value then divided by 2 to account for 
only carrying out essential work on the 
tunnel. Accelerator length calculated by 
extrapolating from (Giraud et al., 2004).  
Enabling later expansion 
of the cryogenics facility 
£5 million This is one quarter of the total cost of the 
cryogenics facility (Safa et al., 2002). 
Increased site size  The geographical site for the reactor 
must be able to accommodate two 
accelerators. 
Planning site utilities  Ensure that there will not be any 
difficulties in later connecting the second 
accelerator to existing site utilities. 
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A second flexible design (named “Accelerator Test”) is considered. In this design 
an accelerator is constructed (over 6 years) and then tested (for 2 years), based 
on the outcome of that testing the operator then decides whether to construct: a 
reactor; a reactor and a second accelerator; or nothing, thus abandoning the 
project. This design keeps the capital required to gain an understanding of 
accelerator reliability low (£442 million). However, the total CapExBFR will be 
larger than for the inflexible designs as it is £2195 million for going on to 
construct a reactor or £2540 million for a reactor and a second accelerator. 
 
The LCOE per MWh as a function of effective OA for the flexible Expandable and 
Accelerator Test designs are considered in comparison to the inflexible Single 
and Dual accelerator(s) designs, as seen in Figure 5. It shows that when 
comparing the Expandable design to the Single accelerator design, the cost of 
planning for the construction of a second accelerator has a negligible impact on 
the LCOE. The Expandable accelerator system is a good compromise between the 
risky, but potentially valuable, option of a Single accelerator ADSR and the more 
reliable Dual accelerator option, for which the most financially beneficial 
possible outcome LCOE is less good than the best arising from the Single 
accelerator design.  The Accelerator Test design has a comparatively poor LCOE 
for all circumstances. 
 
The sensitivity analysis in Figure 5 suggests that if an Expandable ADSR were 
constructed, in instances where OAaccel < 68% it becomes beneficial to build the 
second accelerator. Because financial discounting places more weight on revenue 
which is made sooner in a project rather than later, should the Expandable ADSR 
design have its second accelerator constructed, it can still have a considerably 
higher LCOE than the Dual design. This is due to the second accelerator not being 
available during the first five years of operation. Assuming the project is not 
abandoned, in the Accelerator Test design the second accelerator should be 
constructed along with the reactor when OAaccel < 74%. 
 
 
Figure 5: Levelised Cost of Electricity Production per MWh of electricity sold for two different 
flexible first-of-a-kind ADSRs compared to inflexible designs of one or two accelerator systems. Costs 
are in 2006 money. 
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Step 4: Selecting a Design 
The sensitivity analyses showing the correlation between LCOE and the effective 
OA indicate which design has the lowest LCOE for a given accelerator 
performance. The challenge to a company planning on operating the first-of-a-
kind ADSR is that it will not know the effective OA until after an accelerator has 
been constructed and operated for a number of years. To aid the managerial 
choice of which design to use, decision tree analysis is suggested. The decision 
tree approach assigns probabilities for the likelihood of occurrence of defined 
scenarios. From this information the expected value of the different designs is 
extracted, while remaining quickly tractable. Presently, three example scenarios 
have been hypothesised to demonstrate the decision tree approach. These 
scenarios indicate three different standards the accelerator technology might 
reach once realised (Optimistic, Central and Pessimistic). The scenarios are 
outlined in Table 3. 
 
Before acquiring the site of the future plant a company must commit either to the 
Single, Dual, Expandable or Accelerator Test design. In the decision tree 
methodology the operator assigns probabilities of occurrence to the scenarios 
outlined in Table 3 (or to scenarios of its own choosing). In this example these 
probabilities are assigned to be: ρO, ρC and ρP for the Optimistic, Central and 
Pessimistic scenarios, respectively. These probabilities and the LCOE for each OA 
outcome enable the expected LCOE of each design approach to be calculated. 
 
Table 3: Three possible outcomes for the effective OA of a realised Single accelerator ADSR. 
 
Reliability Scenario Details 
Optimistic The effective OA of an accelerator can match the reactor OA (85%). The system is ~100% reliable. 
Central 
Accelerator reliability is greatly improved 
compared to contemporary systems, but the 
effective OA is only 70%, which results in the plant 
capacity factor being slightly lower than other 
forms of nuclear power station. 
Pessimistic 
Reliability is poor. It may never be possible to 
construct accelerators reliable enough for ADSRs to 
return a profit. The effective OA of the accelerator 
system is 50%. 
 
The branches of the decision tree in Figure 6 correspond to the combinations of 
technology scenarios (Optimistic, Central and Pessimistic) and design decisions 
(Single, Dual, Expandable and Accelerator Test). If one of the flexible designs is 
chosen then there are additional branches as a second decision must be made. In 
the case of the Dual accelerator design, the technology scenario does not impact 
on the LCOE, and so only one branch has been included. Because the LCOE is the 
metric of choice in this decision tree and not net profit/loss, project 
abandonment options have not been considered. 
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Figure 6: Decision tree for strategic decision making. The inflexible and flexible designs are 
considered. Three technology scenarios are presented as example outcomes (Optimistic, Central and 
Pessimistic). The LCOE per MWh (in 2006 money) for each design choice and realisation of the OA is 
indicated. Decision points are indicated with squares and uncertainty is resolved following chance 
nodes, which are the circles. Double slashes indicate a decision that it is not beneficial to follow. 
 
The expected LCOE of each design is used to aid the decision of which to build. 
The expected value is determined by considering the value of each branch and its 
probabilistic likelihood of occurrence. For example, if ρO, ρC and ρP indicate the 
likelihood of realising each technology scenario and LCOEO, LCOEC and LCOEP are 
the LCOE of the Optimistic, Central and Pessimistic scenarios, respectively, then 
the expected value of the Single accelerator configuration (LCOESingle) is: 
 
<LCOESingle> = (ρO  LCOEO) + (ρC  LCOEC) + (ρP  LCOEP) 
 
The design that returns the lowest expected LCOE will be the most valuable 
design, on average. The operator must still consider the up- and down-side risks. 
The accompanying paper by Cardin et al. (2010) gives more detail on this. 
 
 Discussion 
From a reference point of a “benchmark” Single accelerator ADSR, adding 
additional accelerators reduces reliability requirements on each individual 
accelerator, in exchange there is an additional capital expenditure and an 
increase in the facility running costs. This analysis has considered 3-stage LINAC 
accelerators. Their capital cost is large to the point where, if it is anticipated that 
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the most valuable design for an ADSR is for it to have more than two LINACs, 
then ADSRs will probably never be competitive in liberalised electricity markets. 
Other types of accelerators that require less capital will continue to be cost 
competitive for higher multiplicities of the devices. However, establishing the 
most valuable design for the ADSR will only be possible by also considering other 
issues such as: the power provided per accelerator; its reliability; ease of 
operation; complexity of beam transport; accelerator-induced activation of work 
areas; and the increasing complexity of reliably switching between which 
accelerators are providing beam into the core as the number of accelerators and 
trips per accelerator increase. 
 
From presently available data the relationship between the frequency of 
accelerator trips as a function of the fraction of the year an accelerator is 
scheduled to operate is not well defined. The best method of scheduling when 
the ADSR will sell electricity into the market is therefore unknown. At present, 
one cannot establish whether it is better to schedule sales for a small fraction of 
the year, with high reliability or to schedule sales for a large fraction of the year 
and then pay the cost of a comparatively large number of unplanned shutdowns. 
Not understanding the relationship also prevents direct comparisons between 
the performance of Single and Dual accelerator-driven reactors. It has only been 
possible to draw comparisons in the presented analysis because the Single 
accelerator ADSR can only feasibly operate at an accelerator trip frequency that 
is so low that the Dual accelerator ADSR is approximately perfectly reliable for 
the entire range of considered accelerator reliabilities. This will not necessarily 
continue to be the case if an analysis is performed between different designs that 
involve numerous cheaper low-power accelerators. 
 
This analysis has assumed perfect harmonisation of reactor and accelerator 
maintenance schedules, but contemporary accelerator systems require frequent 
maintenance in order to ensure high beam quality, while nuclear reactor cores 
are preferably operated continuously for extended periods of time. If realised 
accelerators cannot reliably operate for extended periods without a break, for a 
Single accelerator ADSR it will not be possible to harmonise the accelerator 
maintenance schedule with the reactor schedule. A Dual accelerator system will 
be more tolerant of this, as the design permits the use of less reliable 
accelerators, i.e. it may be more valuable to postpone otherwise scheduled 
maintenance until the reactor is also scheduled to shut down. 
 
If an ADSR is thorium fuelled there is a possibility that the reactor will achieve a 
higher OA compared to contemporary uranium thermal reactors. In uranium 
reactors there are two key factors that limit the fuel cycle, which is typically 18 
months (WNA, 2006). One is the depletion of fissile material; the other is the 
increase in neutron-absorbing fission products. Each of these issues adversely 
affects the reactor neutron economy, which eventually requires the reactor to 
shut down for refuelling. Thorium fuel is a breeder of fissile nuclides. A thorium 
reactor will breed fissile material at a similar rate as it is burned 
(Carminati et al., 1993). In principle, it is only the build up of fission products 
that leads to the need to refuel a thorium fuelled reactor. This potentially extends 
the fuel cycle to many years. It may therefore be possible for a thorium reactor to 
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reach OAreactor = 95%, which would involve its operating continuously for several 
years between planned shutdowns. The prolonged fuel cycle that one might 
anticipate from a thorium fuelled ADSR is expected to exacerbate the issues in 
harmonising maintenance schedules, as discussed in the previous paragraph. 
 
When two accelerators are constructed, rather than one, they result in the same 
ADSR performance for an accelerator trip rate of many hundreds per year, rather 
than a few tens. It is therefore possible to reduce significantly the R&D that is 
required to build an ADSR, by making a Dual accelerator ADSR the goal design 
rather than the contingency design. Given this, a company may wish to 
concentrate on dual accelerators and reduce its need for R&D. Analysing the cost 
of developing improved accelerator reliability and how component cost 
correspondingly increases or decreases will indicate when it is most valuable to 
switch from research to plant construction. 
 
It is anticipated that a construction cost saving would be made by simultaneously 
building two accelerators. The presented analysis has not taken this potential 
saving into account for the Dual accelerator design (and so one might expect the 
LCOE of the Dual design to be lower than the presented assessment). The saving 
is unlikely to be as great if the accelerators are built at different times, as is the 
case in the Expandable and Accelerator Test designs. Also for these designs a 
second construction phase is required that will also be subject to construction 
risks, such as project overrun or material cost escalation. 
 
The key benefit of the Accelerator Test design is that if accelerator performance 
is determined to be too poor for ADSRs to be profitable a loss of only 
£442 million will be made by abandoning the project after the initial accelerator 
test. The loss made could be as much as four times as large for the Single 
accelerator design. The Dual and Expandable designs, however, are very tolerant 
of poor accelerator reliability. At closure the Dual design will also have returned 
a net loss of ~£442 million if the electricity price is £10 / MWh lower than its 
LCOE, unless accelerator performance is extremely poor. 
 
A factor that only received limited attention in the presented analysis is the 
change in accelerator reliability as a function of time. In contemporary research 
facility accelerator systems it is typical for the reliability of the accelerator beam 
to increase from ~70% in the early years of operation to ~90% for a mature 
facility (Galambos et al., 2008). The presented analysis has assumed that the 
effective OAaccel increases by 5% after 5 years of operation of the accelerator. 
Should ADSR accelerator reliability improve with a steep learning curve, then the 
early years of operation of a Single accelerator ADSR would have a poor 
effective OAaccel. The LCOE would therefore be significantly increased, particularly 
in consideration of the effects of financial discounting.  
 
A speculative idea for a “reactor park” is suggested aimed at improving the 
economic case for ADSRs. Aside from the traditional benefits of building multiple 
reactors at a single geographical site (e.g. sharing site utilities), a reactor park 
has potential for increasing the value of ADSRs through improved operation. If a 
single accelerator cannot reach high reliability, it has been shown that an ADSR 
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has its value increased by building a second accelerator. However, the 
performance and cost of constructing two accelerators may be excessive. If 
multiple reactor cores are constructed at a single location then they may be able 
to share the accelerators between them, achieving optimal benefit through 
balancing accelerator cost and reliability. 
 
For example, if three reactor cores are to be constructed, then a potentially 
valuable way of doing this would be to construct them at the same site along 
with 4 accelerators in a configuration where all of the accelerators can provide 
their beam to any one of the reactors at any moment through a carefully 
managed beam transport system, which is able to quickly respond to the failure 
of an accelerator. Only 3 of the 4 accelerators would need to be working at any 
given time in order to keep all 3 reactors generating electricity (Appendix B 
indicates the frequency at which failures in the accelerator network would lead 
to the shutdown of one of the three reactors). It may be most efficient to first 
construct only a single reactor and two accelerators, followed by twice building 
an additional reactor and accelerator in two subsequent phases. If, as discussed 
above, accelerator reliability is initially poor, but improves significantly over the 
first few years of operation, then this phasing would efficiently reduce the impact 
of the period of poor reliability for each new accelerator. 
 
The principle of a reactor park which hosts an integrated network of accelerators 
also has benefits regarding the management of the maintenance schedules of 
reactors and accelerators, which are anticipated to be poorly harmonised when 
considering only a single reactor. Figure 7 shows a concept sketch of such a 
reactor park, with a suggestion for how to phase its construction. 
 
 
Figure 7: Concept diagram for the suggested reactor park with an integrated network of 
accelerators and reactor cores. The numbers in brackets indicate in which of the three construction 
phases the reactor or accelerator is constructed. This diagram has been modified from reference 
(Pierini, 2007). 
 
 Conclusions 
If an ADSR operator were to sell electricity into the contemporary UK electricity 
market, it would only return a marginal profit if it successfully delivered 
electricity for more than 3 days in every 10 of its contracts. By assuming that all 
other systems are 100% reliable and that an accelerator system failure will cause 
a shutdown 24 hours in duration, it is established that it is not worth scheduling 
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to sell any ADSR-produced electricity unless the accelerator fails less than ~200 
times per year. 
 
Assuming that the relative frequency of failure durations of future accelerator 
systems express similar behaviour to that of contemporary ones, it has been 
demonstrated that an ADSR driven by two accelerators will shut down 
≤ 200 times per year with accelerators that individually trip many hundreds to 
low thousands of times per year. The feasibility of the Dual accelerator design 
hinges on there being a system in place that enables one accelerator to 
compensate for the other within a second of it experiencing a fault. 
 
A top-down financial cost-benefit-analysis has been performed for ADSRs. The 
financial model has been used to examine by how much a second accelerator 
escalates the cost of generating electricity with an ADSR. Without commenting 
on the future price of electricity it has been shown that if accelerator 
performance is poor, Dual accelerator ADSRs do become more valuable than 
Single accelerator designs. It has also been shown that Dual accelerator ADSRs 
eliminate nearly all of the investment uncertainty when considering only risks 
associated with accelerator performance. The downside of this is an increase in 
CapExBFR of ~17.5%. Once other risk factors are taken into account, such as 
construction delays, the increase in initial capital at risk might be considered 
more important than increased reliability during operation. 
 
Real options analysis has identified two more first-of-a-kind ADSR designs. One 
is an Expandable design, where initially a single accelerator is built and a second 
is planned for should it be required. The cost of planning to later build a second 
accelerator is expected to negligibly increase the LCOE if it is not constructed. 
The Expandable design does not increase significantly the CapExBFR. This design 
provides the option to improve reliability, should that be required. The most 
significant trade-off in the presented economic analysis is that reliability can 
only be improved after 5 years of reactor operation, which significantly increases 
the LCOE compared to the Dual design in outcomes where accelerator 
performance is poor. Qualitatively the issue has also been raised that building 
the accelerators at different points in time, rather than in parallel, may result in 
missing out on potentially large economies of scale savings. 
 
The second flexible design is the Accelerator Test design. In this case the capital 
required to test accelerator performance is minimised through only constructing 
an accelerator at first and then building the reactor (and possibly a second 
accelerator) later if it is determined to be beneficial to do so. For this design the 
CapExBFR and the LCOE are significantly worse than for all of the other designs in 
nearly all circumstances. The very high tolerance of poor accelerator reliability of 
the Dual and Expandable designs means that in effect they can also test 
accelerator performance for a similar investment cost as for the Accelerator Test 
design. This is because they (nearly) guarantee successful electricity sales after 
construction. In addition to testing the accelerator system these designs will also 
test all other facets of the design of an ADSR. 
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The concept of a reactor park has been suggested as a way of improving the 
economic case for generating electricity from an ADSR. The reactor park is 
expected to cope with accelerator trips in a more financially efficient way than is 
possible for a single reactor. Greater flexibility in the construction of accelerators 
and reactors is anticipated. In a follow-on from this study the real options 
technique and the decision analysis methodology have been applied with greater 
scope to the design suggestion of an ADSR reactor park (Cardin et al., 2010).  
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 Appendix A – Modes of Operation of a Dual Accelerator 
ADSR 
Three modes in which an ADSR with two accelerators might most beneficially 
operate have been identified, they are labelled (A), (B) and (C). Details of the 
modes are given: 
 
(A) Both accelerators provide 50% of the required proton flux. In the event that 
one accelerator experiences a trip: (1) the other must double its beam current 
and therefore the proton flux it is delivering within 1 second; (2) the ramping 
must not induce a trip in the remaining accelerator; and (3) all elements of beam 
transport must be able to adjust for the change in beam dynamics as the beam 
intensity is doubled, ensuring: (a) that the target receives 100% of its required 
proton flux; and (b) that there is insignificant irradiation of work areas. 
 
(B) One accelerator provides 100% of the required proton flux until it 
experiences a trip, at which point the second accelerator takes over. It is 
assumed that the beam current is negligible or, for example, the ion source 
extraction high voltage supply is off, but all other elements of the second 
accelerator are always in operation. When the first accelerator trips, only the ion 
extraction high voltage supply needs to be turned on in order for the second 
accelerator to start providing protons to the beam target. The ADSR will now be 
driven by the second accelerator until it trips, at which point the first accelerator 
follows the same process and takes over. 
 
(C) While one accelerator provides 100% of the required protons to the target, 
the other accelerator operates at full power with its protons directed into a beam 
dump. When the first accelerator trips the other has its beam redirected from the 
beam dump into the reactor. 
 
Full analysis of these modes of accelerator redundancy has not yet been 
attempted. Notional advantages and disadvantages of each method are given. In 
all modes each accelerator is consuming equal to or nearly full power (100% or 
required protons). This cost will be the least for mode (A). Also, in this mode 
following an accelerator trip, the reactor core will still receive half of its required 
spallation neutrons. This will reduce the rate at which the fission reactions cease 
effectively extending the time window for doubling the beam current of the 
remaining accelerator. Handling the beam dynamics of this mode may be 
difficult. In modes (B) and (C) the beam dynamics will be less complex, as the 
accelerators only operate at a single current and don’t ramp between two. 
Comparing modes (B) and (C), mode (C) is expected to be less demanding on 
accelerator reliability as it is considered more straightforward to adjust a 
magnetic field than ramp the high voltage supply; however, in this mode the 
beam dump will be subject to significant irradiation. It may be beneficial or even 
necessary to keep the redundant beam duty cycle very low in order to limit this 
irradiation. Swiftly increasing the duty cycle could be challenging. The redundant 
beam of mode (C) might be utilisable as a source of income. In mode (B) there is 
a risk of misdirecting the beam thus creating a hazard or damaging equipment. 
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In this mode it may be possible to only switch on systems other than the ion 
source high voltage as and when they are required, reducing accelerator power 
consumption. 
 
The cited 1 second time window for switching on (or ramping) the second 
accelerator is in reference to a 80 MWth fast reactor fuelled 20.5% by plutonium 
and 79.5% by natural uranium (D’Angelo and Gabrielli, 2003; 
D’Angelo et al., 2004). If the reactor fuel were to be switched to an alternative 
fuel (e.g. thorium) the change in the delayed neutron fraction of the fission 
reactions will increase or decrease the time window for meeting the proton flux 
deficit, therefore reducing or increasing the demands on the accelerator-
switching mechanisms. This will affect all proposed modes of operation. 
 
 Appendix B – Frequency of Coinciding Unplanned 
Shutdowns of an Accelerator Network 
An ADSR reactor park consisting of three reactors and four accelerators would 
be least reliable at times when all three reactors are scheduled to sell electricity. 
It is assumed that all four accelerators would be operationally available at these 
times. One of the three reactors would experience an unplanned shutdown if two 
of the four accelerators trip in coincidence. In the limit that all of the reactors are 
scheduled to sell electricity for the same 85% of the year the rate at which one of 
them would experience an unplanned shutdown due to trips in the accelerator 
network is given in the spectrum in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Annual number of coinciding trips of two accelerators in a network of four independent 
accelerators plotted as a function of the number of trips each accelerator experiences. This assumes 
that all of the accelerators are scheduled to operate for the same 85% of the year as each other. 
